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I. INTRODUCTION
Pensions are a very important type of employee benefit, but some
of the problems with them arise precisely because they are employee
benefits. This Article discusses one of those problems: portability.
When employees change jobs, they often lose pension benefits. Some-
times employees may not be fully "vested" in their pensions, and so
they lose all or a part of their benefits when they change jobs. Other
employees may be in plans that implicitly impose penalties for chang-
ing jobs, even if the employees are vested. Portability refers to the
ability of employees to carry their pension benefits with them as they
change jobs.
Concern about limited portability is a current, and recurrent 2 topic
of public policy debate. This article will not resolve much in that de-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REviEW.
* Cline Williams Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. President Clinton and his supporters have often mentioned pension portability as
a priority for a second term. See At the Saver Summit President Clinton An-
nounces a New Step to Boost Pension Coverage, White House Press Release (June
4, 1998) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I12R?urn:pdi'//oma.eop.gov.us
PROBLEM WITH PENSION PORTABILITY
bate. Indeed, its message is quite the opposite: the portability debate
will be very difficult to resolve for two interrelated reasons. First, the
debate involves very difficult questions about the costs and distribu-
tional effects of changes in the rules relating to portability. Pension
portability sounds good in general, as a soundbite or one-line cam-
paign theme. After all, who could be against workers carrying their
pension benefits with them as they change jobs? But pension portabil-
ity will have costs that will be distributed across workers and employ-
ers in a particular way. Those costs and distributional effects pose an
empirical challenge: it is difficult to determine what they are with an
acceptable degree of precision. And they pose a normative challenge:
with its costs and distributional effects, does portability provide a net
benefit? The status quo, which is quite powerful in any event, be-
comes an even more formidable opponent when the consequences of
every alternative are clouded with uncertainty.
Second, the portability debate is difficult because any changes af-
fect, not only the ability of employees to transfer benefits, but also the
calculus employers make when they decide whether to offer pensions
as an employee benefit. Employers offer pensions, not out of the good-
ness of their hearts, but because pensions serve certain functions,
such as retaining good employees, motivating them, and regulating
retirement flows. Portability would interfere with the ability of pen-
sions to perform these functions both directly (by making it more diffi-
cult to use pensions to serve those functions) and indirectly (by
making it more expensive to use pensions for those purposes). Em-
ployers have an option when portability interferes with their ability to
use pensions to pursue their employment objectives: offer fewer and
less generous pensions.
This Article is about pension portability, but the problems ad-
dressed are important and general ones affecting all types of employee
benefits. All employee benefits are part of the compensation package
and, as such, all are designed to pursue certain employment-related
goals. Portability of health care benefits, for example, poses issues
similar to those posed by pension portability.3 Regulation on that is-
1998/6/4111.text.1>; Susan B. Garland & Howard Gleckman, Clinton's Agenda,
Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 30; see also James H. Smalhout, Why Our Pensions
Must Be Made Portable, N.Y. ToIEs, June 30, 1996, § 3, at 9.
2. See Pension Portability Act, H.R. 1874, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); JOINT
COMiT. ON TAXATION, PROPOSALS AND IssuEs RELATING TO THE PORTABILITY OF
PENSION PLAN BENEFITS (JCS 11-88) (1988); Presidents Comm. on Corporate
Pension Funds and Other Retirement and Welfare Programs, Pub. Policy and
Private Pension Programs, A Report to the President on Private Employee Re-
tirement Plans xii, 55-57 (Jan. 1965).
3. The issues are similar on both counts discussed in the text. First, health insur-
ance portability will impose costs and have distributional effects that are impor-
tant, significant and difficult to assess. See AmERICAN ACADEhY OF AcTUARiEs,
PROVIDING UNrVERsAL AcCESS IN A VOLUNTARY PRIVATE-SECTOR MARKET
1998]
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sue, and indeed regulation of all employee benefits, occurs in the con-
text of uncertainty about the costs of regulation and its distributional
effects and about its effect on the continued willingness of employers
to offer the benefit. This Article is intended both as an exploration of
the issue of pension portability and as a case study of the challenges
posed to lawmakers as they consider regulation of employee benefits
generally.
II. PENSION PORTABILITY: THE LANDSCAPE
In general terms, portability refers to the ability of participants to
transfer pension rights from one employer to another following a
change in employment. For convenience, I am going to refer to the
employer that the participant is leaving as the "old employer" and the
employer that the participant is joining as the "new employer."4
(1996)(discussing costs and distributional effects of providing for universal access
to health care within a voluntary insurance market); STEVEN L. WILLBoRN, ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AMD MATERIALS 889 (2d ed. 1998)(citing evidence
that recipients of COBRA continuation coverage receive approximately $3,500 in
health care benefits for every $1,000 paid in premiums). Second, health insur-
ance, like pensions, is closely tied to the labor market. As a result, evaluation of
effects on the labor market must be a part of any evaluation of changes in the
rules regulating portability of health insurance. See Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte
C. Madrian, Health Insurance and Job Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on
Job-Lock, 48 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 86 (1994); Alan C. Monheit & Philip F.
Cooper, Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Theory and Evidence, 48 INnus. &
LAB. REL. REV. 68 (1994).
Having discussed the similarities, it is important to note that important dif-
ferences also exist between pension and health care portability. In general
terms, the main differences are in the type of cost-shifting that occurs under the
two programs and in the nature of the benefits provided. For pensions, the prin-
cipal cost-shifting is intrapersonal. Through pension plans, participants shift in-
come from their working years to their retirement years; pension benefits tend to
be linearly related to contributions into the plan. For health care, the principal
cost-shifting is cross-participant. At any point in time, participants who need
covered medical care are shifting their costs to other participants; benefits tend
not to be linearly related to contributions. Similarly, pensions and health care
are different in the type of benefit they provide. Health insurance provides a
"merit good" which society tends to be unwilling or unable to limit, even if, partic-
ularly for emergency and critical care, the people needing the good are unable to
pay. For pensions, on the other hand, society is more willing and able to limit the
amount provided for retirement income. Although discussion of pension portabil-
ity may inform consideration of health insurance portability, because of these
differences and others, the two issues require independent consideration.
4. A distinction exists between employers and pension plans. A plan may cover a
large number of employers. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Pro-
gram of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(37), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (1994). Indeed, in the public
sector, many of the major plans cover large numbers of employers. For example,
in most states there is a single plan that covers all school teachers in the state.
See CYNTHIA L. MOORE, PUBLIC PENSION PLANS: THE STATE REGULATORY FRAME-
WORK (2d ed. 1993). This is obviously relevant to portability; a teacher moving
from one school district employer to another within the same state often has com-
[Vol. 77:344
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Participants may be interested in transferring two distinct types of
pension rights.5 First, participants may want to transfer service
credit. In general terms, service credit means credit for the number of
years participants have worked with the old employer. 6 Second, par-
ticipants may be interested in transferring assets held on their behalf
in the old employer's fund.
The ability to transfer service credit may be important for partici-
pants in both defined-benefit7 and defined-contribution plans.8 Both
types of plans may have "vesting" requirements that provide for all or
plete portability because she has remained within the same pension plan. How-
ever, a teacher who wants to move to another state or even to another type ofjob
within the state would face a portability problem.
At this point, however, I am not going to make a distinction between employ-
ers and plans. To simplify the discussion, I will be assuming single employer
plans. As a result, the interests of the employer and the plan will be aligned, and
I will be referring only to employers even though technically it may be plans that
reallocate monies or take other actions.
5. In this introductory section, for convenience, I am going to talk only in terms of
the participant's interests in portability. Employers, obviously, also have inter-
ests in the portability issue. I will discuss the relevant interests more completely
later.
6. For our purposes, we need not examine difficulties in determining years of ser-
vice. It should be noted, however, that the issue can be quite complex. See ER-
ISA §§ 202(a)(3), 202(b), 203(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a)(3), 1052(b), 1053(b) (1994)
(defining rules for determining years of service for purposes of applying ERISA's
vesting rules).
7. In defined benefit plans, employers promise employees a "defined benefit" at re-
tirement. The amount of the benefit is determined by a formula specified in the
plan which, in most plans, uses length of service and final salary as variables.
For example, the formula may promise an annual benefit at retirement equal to
.02 (the generosity factor) times years of service times the employee's average
salary over her last three years of employment. Thus, if a thirty-year employee
had an average salary of $50,000 over her last three years of employment, she
would be entitled to an annual pension of $30,000 (.02 x 30 x $50,000). Employ-
ees do not have individual accounts established for them in defined-benefit plans.
Instead, the employer is responsible for making contributions to a trust adequate
to ensure that the promised pensions can be made from the pooled fund. The
amount of contributions required will depend on a complex actuarial analysis
which takes into consideration factors such as the age, length of service, and ex-
pected attrition of employees, projections of future salary increases, and the rate
of return on plan investments. In a defined-benefit plan, the employer bears the
investment risk. If the pension fund's investments do poorly, or if the fund has
too little money to pay the promised pensions for other reasons, the employer is
liable for the shortfall.
8. In defined-contribution plans, employers promise only to make a "defined contri-
bution" into an account established for each employee. The amount of the em-
ployee's benefit at retirement will depend entirely on the amounts contributed
into her individual account and on her account's investment experience. Thus, in
contrast to defined-benefit plans, employees bear the investment risk in defined-
contribution plans. If the investment experience is poor, the amounts employees
will receive at retirement will go down; if the investment experience is good, em-
ployees will receive more in retirement than initially expected.
1998]
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some portion of an employee's pension benefits to be forfeited if she
changes jobs too soon. Generally, employees become fully vested only
after working five to seven years.9 The ability to transfer service
credit would permit more employees to vest and, hence, to receive
amounts that would otherwise remain unvested and thus be forfeited.
For example, an employee who changed jobs every three years would
never vest if all her employers had five-year cliff vesting rules. But if
a portability scheme permitted service credit to be transferred, she
could vest after two years with her second employer and with every
later employer.
The ability to transfer service credit is important in defined-benefit
plans even for participants who are vested with the old employer. One
of the elements of the formula that defines an employee's pension in a
defined-benefit plan is "final salary."io As long as an employee contin-
ues to work for the same employer, this element serves to index the
employee's pension to wage inflation. That is, as the employee's wages
go up, so does the pension promised to the employee. But, in the ab-
sence of portability, when an employee leaves an employer, the final
salary element of the pension formula is frozen at the amount of her
final salary with that employer. If ten years elapse before she begins
to receive the pension, it is quite likely that its value will be considera-
bly diminished because of inflation. On the other hand, if the em-
ployee could transfer her years of service to her new employer and
insert those years into the new employer's pension formula, the wage-
indexing property of the final salary component of the pension formula
would continue to work its magic. As will be detailed in a later sec-
tion,1 1 this effect of portability-permitting employees to retain wage-
indexed pensions-can be quite significant.
Participants may also be interested in the portability of assets held
on their behalf by the old employer's fund. Participants may want as-
9. ERISA limits the vesting requirements of private plans. Plans governed by ER-
ISA must have vesting schedules no longer than five or seven years. See ERISA
§ 203(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (1994). Plans offered by public employers are
not governed by ERISA and, as a result, may have longer vesting periods. The
vesting period for public employees often extends to ten years and beyond. See
FRANK V. AURIEMMA ET AL., GRAYING TEACHERS: A REPORT ON STATE PENSION
SYSTEMS AND SCHOOL DISTRICT EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVES 38 (1992)(vesting
periods for state retirement programs for teachers range from three to twenty
years, with five and ten years being the most common periods).
10. "Final salary" itself, obviously, can be defined in ways that can significantly effect
a participant's pension. For example, final salary defined as the participant's
wages over the last year is generally more advantageous to a participant than
final salary defined as the average of the participant's wages over the last three
years. Regardless of how it is defined, however, as long as the employee keeps
working for the same employer, the term serves to index a participant's pension
to wage inflation.
11. See infra Part III.A.1.
[Vol. 77:344
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sets transferred from the old to the new employer for a number of rea-
sons. For example, the participant may think that the new employer's
fund is more stable financially or has better investment advisors; the
transfer may permit the participant to buy years of service credit in
the new employer's plan; or the transfer may simply make it easier for
the participant to keep track of her money by minimizing the number
of accounts. As a general matter, in contrast to the portability of ser-
vice credit, enhanced portability of assets would not be likely to have a
significant financial effect. Employees would have greater control over
who holds their money, but the amount of money held would be about
the same.1 2
III. EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
ENHANCED PORTABILITY
The portability debate is difficult, in part, because evaluating the
costs and benefits of enhanced portability is quite difficult. A number
of factors are relevant to the evaluation and not all of them cut in the
same direction. Moreover, a number of the factors are quite difficult to
assess because their impact depends on unknown information, for ex-
ample, about how the labor market operates. This section will discuss
these difficulties by surveying and assessing the relevant factors and
by pointing out where roadblocks to full assessment exist. The section
is divided into three major parts: the financial effects of enhanced
portability, the labor market effects, and administrative and technical
issues.
12. Legislative efforts to enhance portability have focused on this type of portability
by making it easier for participants to transfer monies between retirement ac-
counts, especially between defined-contribution accounts. In 1992, Congress
eased the "rollover" rules to clarify and expand the situations in which distribu-
tions from qualified plans could be rolled over into other retirement accounts,
including Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). See MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALI-
FIED RETIrEiENT AND O=R EMPLOYEE BENEFIrr PLANs § 15.8 (Practitioner Ed.
1996). More recent proposals have also focused on the ability to transfer funds
between defined-contribution accounts. See Retirement Account Portability Act
of 1998, H.R. 3503, 104th Cong. (1998)(allowing participants in defined contribu-
tion plans to roll over account balances among Section 401(k), 403(b), and 457
plans); Pension Coverage and Portability Act, § 2329, 104th Cong. (1998)(same).
The legislative focus on this type of portability is both understandable and
ironic. It is understandable because it is relatively simple to accomplish and im-
poses few extra costs on plans and employers. It is ironic because, in contrast to
the ability to transfer service credit, this type of enhanced portability provides
only a very limited extra benefit to mobile workers.
1998]
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A. Financial Effects
1. Sources of Increased Benefits and Costs
As indicated in Section I, enhanced portability of service credit
would tend to increase costs and benefits in two primary ways. First,
enhanced portability would ease vesting requirements indirectly.
Without portability, workers lose their unvested benefits when they
change employers. If workers could transfer their service credit to
new employers, they could maintain their claim on unvested benefits
and eventually work long enough for them to vest. To the extent
workers eventually vest in benefits that would otherwise be forfeited,
worker benefits have increased. To the same extent, employer costs
have increased.3 Without portability, employers never incur the ex-
pense of making payments for forfeited unvested benefits; with porta-
bility, those benefits will eventually have to be paid to workers.i4
For defined-benefit plans, enhanced portability of service credit
would also tend to increase costs and benefits for another reason: it
would increase the ability of workers to take advantage of the wage-
inflation index inherent in defined-benefit plans.15 Defined-benefit
plans normally multiply three components to determine a worker's
13. For both worker benefits and employer costs, the analysis at this point assumes a
static world in which employers do not react to changes in portability rules. I will
discuss benefits and costs in a more dynamic world later. See infra Part m.A.2.
14. Vesting applies to both defined-contribution and defined-benefit plans. Thus, this
type of increased benefits/costs would affect both types of plans.
Note that, although I have discussed this in the context of a transfer of service
credit, this type of portability also entails assets. For defined-contribution plans,
workers would be interested in the enhanced vesting primarily because the old
employer transfers assets. Otherwise, the worker would vest sooner, but only in
assets contributed by the new employer. The worker would likely acquire a
vested right to those assets later anyway. The real enticement for workers is the
opportunity to maintain their claim on the old employer's contributions. Obvi-
ously, those few employees who change jobs so often that they would not vest in
the new employer's plan absent portability would benefit even if the old em-
ployer's contributions were not transferred.
For defined-benefit plans, new employers would be unlikely to be willing to
accept the transfer of service credit if assets were not available to support the
ultimate payments of benefits. A true portability scheme would require that old
employers transfer to new employers the assets that had been accumulated on
behalf of the worker. A quasi-portability scheme would permit the worker to
transfer service credits, but only if the worker provided assets to support their
ultimate payment.
15. This reason for increased costs and benefits does not exist for defined-contribu-
tion plans. After vesting, years of service do not affect benefits in defined-contri-
bution plans; instead, after vesting, workers are merely entitled to the entire
amount in their pension account. Thus, after vesting in defined-contribution
plans, the ability to transfer years of service will not increase or decrease costs or
benefits.
[Vol. 77:344
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pension: a coefficient,1 6 years of service, and final salary. With that
structure in mind, consider the experience of two workers with identi-
cal salary histories-each started with a salary of $20,000/year, re-
ceived 6% annual salary increases, worked for thirty years, and thus
ended with a salary of $108,370/year. The two worked for employers
who made identical defined benefit promises-to pay a pension equal
to 1.5% times years of service times final salary. The only difference
between the workers is that Worker A spent her entire career with
one employer, while Worker B split her career equally between two
employers.1 7
a. Table 1: The Wage-Indexing Effect of Portability
Years of Final Total
Worker Employer Coefficient Service Salary Pension Pension
A 1 .015 30 $108,370 $48,766 $48,766
B 1 .015 15 45,219 10,174
2 .015 15 108,370 24,383 34,557
Worker B suffers a pension penalty of about $14,000 because of her
job change. The penalty occurs because the "final salary" component
of the pension formula indexes the pension to wage inflation, and B
lost that index when she left her first job and her final salary was
frozen at $45,219.18
16. The coefficient is the percentage of the participant's final salary that accrues for
each year of service. It is specified by the employer and generally falls some-
where between 1% and 2.5%. The coefficient is often given other names, such as
"multiplier" or "generosity factor."
17. This example is adapted from Michael Falivena, Pension Portability: No Easy
Solution, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 15 (February 5, 1990), cited in JOHN H.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 85 (2d ed.
1995). Falivena's example considers other employees who split their careers be-
tween even more employers and who, therefore, suffer even greater pension
losses.
18. Another way to see this is to calculate the extra pension that would be due
Worker B if the final salary for Employer 1 had been indexed to wage inflation.
The extra that would be due is equal to .015 times the years with that employer
(15) times the difference between the indexed and unindexed salaries ($108,370 -
$45,219 = $63,151). Making that calculation, the extra that would be due is
$14,209, which equals the difference in the total pensions received by Workers A
and B.
Economists use different names for this penalty and attempt to estimate it in
slightly different ways. See STUART DORSEYv ET AL., PENSIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY
25 (1998)(pension quit penalty); RICHARD IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 141-150 (1986)(pension capital loss); Alan L. Gustman & Thomas
L. Steinmeier, Pension Portability and Labor Mobility: Evidence from the SIPP,
50 J. Pub. Econ. 299 (1993)(backloading); Edward P. Lazear & Robert Moore,
Pensions and Turnover, in PENSIONS IN THE U.S. EcoNoMY 163, 163-68 (Zvi Bodie
et al., eds., 1988)(pension option value).
1998]
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Portability of service credit would permit Worker B to avoid this
loss. Portability would have permitted Worker B to transfer her 15
years of service to Employer 2 who then would have paid a pension
equal to .015 times 30 years times $108,370 = $48,766. That is,
Worker B would have received the same yearly pension as Worker A
who did not change jobs. This increased benefit for Worker B, of
course, would be an increased cost for Employers 1 and 2.19
As noted above,20 the ability of vested workers to transfer the as-
sets of defined-contribution plans between employers when they
change jobs does not generally entail increased costs or benefits.
Without portability, vested workers would be entitled to the entire
amount in their pension account with their old employer. The amount
may be managed by their old employer, or workers may be able to roll
it over into an account they manage themselves. With portability,
vested workers would still be entitled to the entire amount in their
pension account with their old employer. Portability would permit
workers to transfer the account to their new employer, but it would
not increase (or decrease) the amount in the account.21
2. Magnitude and Distribution of Increased Costs and Benefits
Assessing the magnitude and distribution of increased costs and
benefits flowing from enhanced portability of service credit is difficult.
This section begins by discussing portability in a static world where
employers do not react to the change in portability by making other
changes. Then the issue is discussed in a more dynamic world where
employers react in various ways. The dynamic world, of course, is
more realistic, but it is even more uncertain than the static world.
A Static World. Let's start with a very simple world. Assume that
Employers 1 and 2 from Table 1 change from a system in which ser-
vice credit cannot be transferred to one in which it can. No other
changes are made. Employers 1 and 2 will want to assess both the
magnitude of the increased costs to be expected from the change and
the distribution of those costs between them.
The magnitude will depend on the number of workers that transfer
between the two employers and their characteristics. Consider vest-
19. Under a quasi-portability scheme, Employer 2 would permit Worker B to
purchase service credit for her years of service with Employer 1. Depending on
the price, then, the increased cost could be borne entirely by Worker B, or shared
by Employer 2 and Worker B. This type of quasi-portability scheme-that is,
allowing workers to purchase years of service credit-is quite common in the pub-
lic sector.
20. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
21. In contrast to unvested workers and workers in defined-benefit plans, enhanced
portability does not directly increase the benefits of vested workers in defined-
contribution plans. Under certain circumstances, however, tax considerations
may produce indirect benefits from enhanced portability.
[Vol. 77:344
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ing effects first. The employers might try to estimate the expected cost
of the change by looking to see how many unvested workers trans-
ferred between the two in the past and what the value of those un-
vested benefits were. With enhanced portability, those unvested
benefits would no longer be forfeited.22 Their value would be an esti-
mate of the extra cost of enhanced portability.2 3 But it would only be
an estimate. With a non-portability rule, an unvested worker who is
dissatisfied with his work at Employer 1 would be neutral (vis-a-vis
his pension) between transferring to Employer 2 and any other em-
ployer; in either case, he would lose his unvested benefits. With a
portability rule, the worker would prefer Employer 2 to all other em-
ployers.24 Thus, one would expect some workers with unvested bene-
fits who transferred to other employers prior to the change in the
portability rule to transfer to Employer 2 after the change. The value
of the unvested benefits of those workers would also be extra costs
caused by enhanced portability. But it would also be quite difficult to
estimate the magnitude of this extra cost.25
22. Or, at least, most of them would not be forfeited anymore. Some workers who
transfer to Employer 2 may not stay there long enough to vest in the benefits,
even with portability. To estimate this cost of enhanced portability, then, one
would have to discount the value of forfeited benefits under a non-portability rule
to account for these super-mobile workers.
23. Note that one would expect more workers to transfer between Employers 1 and 2
after the change in portability rules-one of the factors that inhibited movement
between the employers (loss of unvested pension benefits)-has been removed.
But workers who change employers because of the change in portability rules
would not impose an extra cost on the employers. Without the change, those
workers would stay with their original employers and vest in their benefits; they
would receive the same amount of benefits under either a portability or non-port-
ability rule, albeit from different employers. It is only those workers who would
change jobs even without the change in portability rules who impose an extra
cost; those workers would suffer a pension loss under a non-portability rule.
Although workers who change employers because of the change in portability
rules would not impose an extra cost on employers, the increased ability of those
workers to transfer to presumptively more desirable jobs would seem to be a ben-
efit of enhanced portability. I discuss that point later in the section on labor mar-
ket effects. See infra Part IH.B.
24. This example assumes, of course, that some employers (Employers 1 and 2) would
be covered by the portability rule and that other employers would not be. This
will always be the case. If the portability rule were inserted into ERISA, for ex-
ample, it would cover only employers covered by ERISA. See ERISA § 4(b), 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1994)(ERISA does not cover plans offered by government em-
ployers or churches). Even if the portability rule had broader applicability, some
workers who leave Employer 1 will enter self-employment or obtain employment
with employers that do not offer a pension plan at all.
25. A range could be estimated. The minimum would be zero and the maximum
would be the forfeited benefits ofunvested workers who transferred to employers
other than Employer 2. Determining what proportion of the maximum would
constitute the cost is what would be difficult. Consider any individual worker.
Presumptively, that worker preferred the other employer to Employer 2 (other-
wise she would have transferred to Employer 2). But it would be difficult to de-
19981
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Estimating the magnitude of the extra costs from wage-inflation
effects presents similar difficulties. The employers could make a
rough estimate by looking at their past experience with workers who
transferred between the two employers: What was the magnitude of
the wage-inflation losses suffered by that class of workers? This esti-
mate is likely to be less accurate than the comparable estimate for
vesting effects. 26 The wage-inflation estimate, as with the estimate
for vesting effects, would also have to consider extra costs arising from
the increased attractiveness of Employer 2 vis-A-vis all other employ-
ers. The wage-inflation effect of enhanced portability will encourage
some workers who would leave Employer 1 and go to other employers
otherwise, to go instead to Employer 2. That will contribute to the
increased costs caused by enhanced portability, but estimating the
number of workers whose decision will be tipped by this consideration
would be quite difficult.
Estimations of the distribution of the extra costs between the two
employers is also likely to be imprecise. The estimation would depend
on two primary factors: 1) the allocation rules agreed to by the em-
ployers and 2) the experience of the employers. Consider vesting ef-
fects first. Assume that the portability arrangement specifies the
following allocation rule: the old employer will transfer to the new
employer the unvested assets of a transferring worker who later vests
with the new employer. 2 7 This rule tends to allocate the increased
costs to the old employer.28 In the absence of enhanced portability, it
termine the strength of that preference. If the worker valued the preference at
more than the value of the unvested benefits, she would transfer to the other
employer even with enhanced portability, so no extra pension costs would occur.
On the other hand, if the worker valued the preference at less than the value of
the unvested benefits, she would transfer to Employer 2 instead, and there would
be extra pension costs.
26. With the vesting effect, for example, one only needs to look at a relatively narrow
class of transferring workers ("new" workers who have not yet vested), but the
wage-inflation effect would apply to every worker who transfers between the two
employers. Errors are more likely with the larger class of workers. Also, wage
inflation itself plays a greater role in estimating the wage-inflation effect than in
estimating the vesting effect. Thus, even if the wage-inflation prediction used to
estimate costs is equally inaccurate, it would result in greater imprecision in the
wage-inflation effect calculation than in the vesting effect calculation.
27. Although this seems to be the "natural" allocation rule, there is no reason in the-
ory why the costs could not be allocated to the new employer. For example, the
allocation rule could be that each new employer agrees to pay the unvested bene-
fits of transferring workers, but that the old employer does not transfer the funds.
28. If the transferred assets precisely match the present value of the promised bene-
fits from the years of service transferred, the costs will be completely and pre-
cisely allocated to the old employer. This would be the case with a defined-
contribution plan because the promised benefit for the years of service trans-
ferred is equal to the amount of money transferred for those years. However, it
may not be the case with defined-benefit plans. If, for example, a plan is system-
atically underfunded, the amount transferred would be less than the present
[Vol. 77:344
PROBLEM WITH PENSION PORTABILITY
would be the old employer that recaptures the forfeited assets; now
the employer has to forward them to the new employer for eventual
distribution to the worker. But the actual distribution of the costs be-
tween Employer 1 and 2 will depend on their experience. If only one
benefiting worker transfers, say from Employer 1 to Employer 2, Em-
ployer 1 would bear all of the vesting-effects costs of enhanced porta-
bility. If one worker goes each way (and each has equal unvested
amounts), the costs would be distributed evenly between the two em-
ployers. The actual distribution, then, would depend on the allocation
rule and the experience of the employers under the rule.2 9
This same basic analysis applies to the distribution of the extra
costs caused by the wage-inflation effect. Any portability arrangement
would have to set an allocation rule. For any individual transferring
worker, the rule could impose the extra costs from the wage-inflation
effect on either employer alone or share it between them.SO As before,
however, the actual distribution of the costs would depend both on
that rule and the experience of the employers. For example, if the rule
is that new employers bear the extra costs caused by the wage-infla-
tion effect and only one transferring employee benefits, the new em-
ployer receiving the worker would bear all of the costs of the new
portability rule. Once again, estimates of distributional effects are
likely to be more uncertain for wage-inflation effects than for vesting
effects.
Workers would also be interested in the magnitude and distribu-
tion of the increased benefits flowing from enhanced portability. In
our static world, the magnitude of the increased benefits for workers
would be the same as the magnitude of the increased costs for employ-
ers, and subject to the same uncertainties. The increased benefits,
however, would not be distributed uniformly across all workers. Obvi-
value of the promised benefits, which would mean that the new employer would
eventually have to make up the difference.
29. An allocation rule could be devised that attempted to obviate the influence of
actual experience on the distribution of costs. For example, the allocation rule
could be that the vesting effects costs of Employers 1 and 2 will be totaled at the
end of each year and divided equally.
30. As part of the portability agreement, the old employer could agree to use the
worker's final salary with the new employer to calculate its pension obligation
(which would allocate the increased costs to the old employer); the new employer
could agree to use all of the worker's years of service to calculate its pension and
offset the total by the amount the worker receives from the old employer (which
would allocate the increased costs to the new employer); or the two employers
could agree to share the increased costs in some way.
In this section, I am considering true portability. Under a quasi-portability
scheme, the worker could purchase years of service credit from the new employer.
The allocation of the increased costs under that type of scheme would be between
the worker and the new employer and, obviously, would depend heavily on the
purchase price.
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ously, enhanced portability would benefit more mobile workers.
Workers who never change jobs do not care about portability; only
workers who change jobs would share in the increased benefits. Com-
pared to the composition of the labor market overall, the group of more
mobile workers who would receive a disproportionate share of the in-
creased benefits would be likely to contain a higher proportion of wo-
men, the young, non-union members, low-income workers, less-
educated workers, and workers without health insurance.3 1
A Dynamic World. In our static world, we assessed financial effects
assuming that the only change made was the change in the portability
rule. The world, however, is not static; it is dynamic. It is quite possi-
ble that a change in the portability rule would induce other changes in
the pension system. This section will discuss financial effects in a
more dynamic and uncertain world.
Consider our wage-inflation example again. In our static world,
portability created an increased cost for the two employers (and bene-
fit to Worker B) of about $14,000. If the employers had known about
the portability rule in advance, 3 2 how might they have reacted to min-
imize (or even eliminate) the increased cost? They have many options.
In broad terms, they could have decreased the coefficient, changed the
way in which years of service are calculated,3 3 changed the way in
which final salary is calculated,3 4 or reduced the rate of salary in-
creases. 3 5 I do not have time or space to consider all these options
31. See Kenneth A. Swinnerton & Howard Wial, Is Job Stability Declining in the U.S.
Economy?, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 293 (1995); Monheit & Cooper, supra note
3.
32. In the long run, of course, employers always know of changes "in advance" and,
hence, can react to them. In the short run, the world is less dynamic. As a gen-
eral matter, this means that the static world description of costs to employers and
benefits to workers is more likely to be accurate in the short run and the dynamic
world description of distributional effects between groups of workers is more
likely to be accurate in the long run.
33. For example, they could have delayed the time when workers are permitted to
begin accumulating years of service, increased the minimum number of hours
worked necessary to get credit for a year of service, decreased the generosity of
the break-in-service rules, or placed a cap on the maximum number of years of
service a worker can accumulate. Some of these options may be limited by the
rules for tax qualification.
34. For example, they could refuse to consider pension contributions as part of final
salary or increase the length of time over which final salary is computed (e.g.,
using the average yearly salary over the past three or five years, instead of the
final salary from the last year of work). Once again, tax qualification laws may
impose some limits on the ability of employers to use these options.
35. Reducing the rate of salary increases is a different type of response than the
others in a couple of respects. First, the other responses all operate to reduce
pensions; reducing the rate of salary increases reduces both pensions and pre-
retirement pay. Thus, the other responses tend to distribute the costs of en-
hanced portability across the group of workers receiving pensions, while this re-
sponse tends to distribute the costs across all workers. Second, tax laws may
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fully. But let me describe one of the possibilities - decreasing the
coefficient - so that I can use it as an example of the general effects
when employers react in these ways.
Assume the employers reacted to the change in the portability rule
by reducing the coefficient from 1.5% to 1.28%.36 Let's look at the ef-
fects of the enhanced portability on the pensions received by Workers
A and B in this more dynamic world:
b. Table 2: Effects of Enhanced Portability in a Dynamic
World
Worker Worker
A B Total
Static World Examples
Original Example: $48,766 $34,557 $83,323
.015 x years x salary
Not portable
Portability Example: 48,766 48,766 97,532
.015 x years x salary
Portable
Dynamic World Example
Reduced Coefficient 41,661 41,661 83,322
.0128 x years x salary
Portable
In our original static world example, the enhanced portability cre-
ated an increased benefit of about $14,000 for Worker B and an in-
creased cost of that amount for the employers. The distributional
issues were 1) how will the portability arrangement allocate the in-
creased cost between the two employers and 2) what kinds of employ-
limit the ability of employers to pursue the other options, but would not affect the
option of reducing the rate of salary increases.
36. The actual generosity factor I used in the calculations below was .012814585. As
you will see, this was not a randomly selected number. It is, however, within the
range of generosity factors that are in use. Moreover, since the original generos-
ity factor was 1.5%, the reduction of .22% is well within the range of reductions
that might be possible. See AuRmzus ET AL., supra note 9, at 40 (showing a
range of 1.1% to 2.5% in the generosity factors used in the 50 states for teachers'
systems in 1990).
It should be noted that this example assumes that the reduction in the gener-
osity factor occurs before any pension benefits are earned by A or B. A retroactive
reduction in the generosity factor would present problems. See ERISA § 204(g),
29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1994)(no retroactive reductions in accrued benefits).
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ees are likely to be Worker B types 37 who will receive the increased
benefits?
In our dynamic world example, the increased benefit to workers as
a group and cost to employers as a group have disappeared-the re-
duction in the coefficient has completely and precisely offset the over-
all effects of enhanced portability.3 8 As a result, the distributional
issues are quite different and even more complex. In the static world,
the change in the portability rule alone meant that employers as a
group would lose and workers as a group would win. The only issue
was to identify which employers were likely to bear the losses and
which workers were likely to reap the gains. In the dynamic world,
both employers and workers can be either winners or losers. Worker
A, in our example, has suffered a loss from the changes in the portabil-
ity rule and coefficient; enhanced portability did not help her and the
reduced coefficient hurt her. Worker B enjoyed a gain; enhanced port-
ability helped her more than she lost from the reduced coefficient.
This example illustrates the general principles in operation in a
dynamic world. If employers react to enhanced portability by making
precisely offsetting reductions elsewhere, there would be no net in-
crease in costs to employers or benefits to workers. Instead of magni-
tude effects, enhanced portability would have only distributional
effects. Some workers (and employers) would gain, others would lose.
One's view of the desirability of portability would then depend on one's
view of the propriety of the distributions between types of workers and
between types of employers, rather than on any overall benefits flow-
ing to workers from employers.
Not all employers, of course, would be able to make offsetting
changes. Labor market or political factors may intervene. Similarly,
even if offsetting changes are possible, employers are quite unlikely to
be able to make precise estimates of the extent of offset necessary.
The static world example illustrates an extreme under-offset (i.e., no
offset); in that case, workers enjoy a net benefit and employers have
increased costs. To the extent employers over-offset, workers suffer a
net loss and employers have decreased costs. 39
37. Pun intended.
38. Note that the difference between the total pension benefits/costs in the original
example (last column of the first row, $83,323) and the total pension benefits/
costs in the dynamic world example (last column of the last row, $83,322) is due
only to rounding error.
39. With respect to any particular portability arrangement, of course, employers
would be likely to use actuaries to estimate the expected costs. Actuaries, how-
ever, are not much better at predicting the future than the rest of us. Estimating
the costs of some type of general or all-purpose portability agreement would be
very difficult even with the use of actuaries, and impossible to do precisely.
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B. Labor Market Effects
The labor market effects of enhanced portability depend a great
deal on contested notions about the nature of labor markets. Under
an auction model of labor markets, enhanced portability would lead to
greater efficiency. Under a life-cycle model, matters are not so clear.
This section will present sketches of both models and discuss briefly
their implications for portability.
Under the auction model of labor markets, a worker's wages are
equal to the value of the marginal product produced by the worker in
each period. Workers sort into jobs which maximize the value of the
marginal product they produce in each period and, by so doing, maxi-
mize their wages. Thus, any restrictions on mobility impede the effi-
cient flow of workers to jobs in which they can produce the highest
valued marginal product. Any restrictions on mobility are inefficient.
As the previous section illustrates, non-portability can impose sig-
nificant financial penalties on workers when they change jobs. As a
result, non-portability constitutes one type of restriction on mobility.
Commentators adopting the auction view of the labor market have
long argued that limits on the portability of pensions impede labor
market efficiency. 40 Conversely, enhanced portability would improve
labor market efficiency by permitting workers to move more freely into
higher-value jobs.
The life-cycle model views the employment relationship with a
longer telescope: instead of maximizing productivity and wages in
every period (as in the auction model), the worker is attempting to
maximize life-time earnings. 41 One consequence of the life-cycle
model is that workers can be too mobile; in some situations, labor mar-
ket efficiency can be enhanced through restrictions on mobility. Thus,
pensions may serve functions (such as bonding workers to a firm, dis-
couraging shirking, or regulating retirement flows) that enhance over-
all labor market efficiency.42
40. See PAT CHOATE & J.K. LINGER, THE H-FLEx SOCIETY 245 (1986)("Weaknesses in
pension availability, benefits, and portability are now impeding the mobility that
is so essential during this period of economic and technological turbulence, as an
aging work force avoids job changes to protect pension rights."); Arthur Ross, Do
We Have a New Feudalism?, 48 Ai. ECON. REv. 903 (1958)(arguing that ex-
panded pension coverage will tie workers to jobs so that they will not be able to
respond to new opportunities).
41. For good descriptions of the model in the legal literature, and applications to
other issues, see Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just
Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8 (1993), and Michael L.
Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining:
An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Clo-
sure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1988).
42. Surveying these functions is beyond the scope of this article. For good surveys,
see DORsEY ET AL., supra note 18; Stuart Dorsey, Pension Portability and Labor
Market Efficiency: A Survey of the Literature, 48 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 276
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Consider, as one example, the availability of on-the-job training.
Under conditions of extreme mobility, employers would be reluctant to
provide expensive on-the-job training. Workers would accept the
training and then move on to other employers who are able to pay
more because they do not undergo the expense of providing training.
A restriction on mobility, such as the penalty that would be suffered if
the worker had a non-portable pension, would permit employers to of-
fer such training. The restriction would mean that they would be
more likely to be able to recoup the expenses of the training. Thus,
restrictions on mobility may enhance labor market efficiency because
they may facilitate the provision of productivity-enhancing, on-the-job
training.43
The life-cycle model is less dogmatic on the portability issue than
the auction model. Under the auction model, limits on mobility are
inefficient and ought to be discouraged. Under the life-cycle model,
limits on mobility may be efficient or inefficient, depending on the
circumstances. 44
Considering labor market effects is very important in the portabil-
ity debate. When the portability issue is raised, the simplistic solution
often offered is to require defined-contribution plans with very short
vesting periods.45 That solution does "solve" the portability problem,
narrowly construed, because workers would generally be able to carry
their pension benefits with them as they changed jobs. But the effec-
tiveness of the solution as a public policy initiative is much less clear.
Employers offer pensions as a part of the compensation package, not
out of the goodness of their hearts, but because pensions serve certain
functions. To the extent the simplistic solution interferes with the
ability of employers to use pensions to achieve their employment
(1995); Alan L. Gustman, et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A
Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 417 (1994).
43. Once again, a complete survey of the employment-related functions served by
pensions is beyond the scope of this article. For my purposes, it is sufficient to
make the general point that pensions, and specifically non-portable pensions,
serve certain productivity-enhancing fimctions, such as discouraging shirking
(especially for jobs that are hard to monitor), minimizing the losses from exces-
sive turnover in response to small or temporary economic shocks, and regulating
retirement flows. As a result, enhanced portability may well mean that employ-
ers are less interested in offering pensions as a part of the compensation package.
For a more detailed consideration of the functions served by non-portable pen-
sions, see the articles cited supra note 42.
44. Note that simply because the life-cycle model implies that limits on mobility can
sometimes be efficient, does not imply that limits on mobility are always efficient.
Limits on mobility that do not create benefits (in such things as enhanced on-the-
job training, reduced shirking, and better management of retirement flows) are
inefficient for the reasons indicated by the auction model.
45. See, e.g., Stephen Glass, A Pension Deficit Disorder, 71 PoL'Y REv. 71, 72
(1995)(iThere is a simple pension reform that would permit [completely portable
pensions]. It is called a defined-contribution system.").
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goals, employers will be less likely to include them in the compensa-
tion package. To the extent employers cannot use pensions to discour-
age workers from leaving until after the costs of on-the-job training
have been recouped, or to regulate retirement flows, or to serve any
other function, they will be less likely to offer a pension. The simplis-
tic solution would guarantee more portable pensions, but at a cost. It
may also mean that employers are less interested in offering pensions
at all and, hence, that workers are less likely to have pensions.4 6 It is
that balance-between portability and the availability of pensions-
that makes consideration of labor market effects critical in the porta-
bility debate.47
C. Administrative and Technical Issues
Portability also raises several administrative and technical issues,
especially for defined-benefit plans. One set of problems arises be-
cause plans have different contribution rates and benefit formulas.
Portability creates a relationship between two (or more) plans and, as
a result, requires that plans deal with some of these differences. This
is a broad set of problems, and I do not intend to cover them all here.
But consider, as an example, the pension systems for teachers in the
neighboring states of Kansas and Missouri. In Kansas, employee and
employer contributions into the retirement fund total about seven per-
cent of employee compensation. In Missouri, the contributions total
about twenty percent. In Kansas, the general benefit formula is
(1.4%) x (years of service) x (final average salary). In Missouri, the
general benefit formula is (2.1%) x (years of service) x (final average
salary).48 Let's say Employee 1 transfers from a school in Kansas to
46. Enhanced portability would adversely affect some, but not all, of the finctions for
which employers offer pensions. Enhanced portability would limit the ability of
employers to use pensions to pursue the employment goals mentioned in the text,
but it would not infringe on the pursuit of other goals, such as capturing tax
benefits. For a brief review of the functions of employee benefits in the compensa-
tion package, see WiLLBoRN ET AL., supra note 3, at 758-65. As a result, it is
important not to over-emphasize the extent to which enhanced portability would
reduce pension availability. Some employers at the margin would not offer pen-
sions because of their reduced usefulness, but others would continue to offer them
because they fulfill other employment functions.
47. Although critical, as this discussion makes clear, consideration of labor market
effects is very difficult. Major disagreements are likely to arise both about how
the labor market operates (for example, is the auction model or the life cycle
model predominant) and about the actual effect enhanced portability might have
on the extent and generosity of pensions within any model.
48. These figures are for 1990 and are from A=AriwA Er AL., supra note 9, at 33, 40.
Please note that I am making a general point here about the need to accommo-
date differences and not a specific point about the Kansas or Missouri systems.
Overall, Kansas' level of benefits may well be higher than Missouri's. Kansas, for
example, participates in the social security system, while Missouri does not
(although, if anything, that tends to aggravate the accommodation problem be-
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one in Missouri. If a portability agreement requires Kansas to trans-
fer the money and Missouri to credit years of service, there is a prob-
lem. The money transferred is low because of the relatively low level
of contributions in Kansas, but the value of the years of service is high
because of the relatively high coefficient in Missouri. The incentive to
move from Kansas to Missouri (considering only pension benefits)
would be high; the incentive to move the other way low. Any portabil-
ity arrangement would have to make some accommodation.4 9
In general terms, differences in contribution rates and benefit for-
mulas can have a significant influence on the cost of a portability ar-
rangement and on the incentives it creates. As a result, portability
arrangements must consider and accommodate these differences.
This is a serious problem because pension plans can (and generally do)
differ on a large number of parameters: level of contributions by par-
ticipant, level of contributions by employer, eligibility for retirement
rules, rules for determining number of years of service, the coefficient
used in the benefit formula, how to calculate the final salary to be used
in the benefit formula, and a multitude of other factors. 50
Portability would also raise administrative and technical issues re-
lating to operation of plans overall. Generally, defined-benefit plans
pay benefits over a period of time commencing at the worker's retire-
ment, rather than in a lump sum paid at some earlier time. If porta-
bility required old employers to make lump sum payments to new
employers at the time the worker transfers, plans could face cash flow
problems. In extreme cases, plans could be forced to liquidate invest-
cause social security benefits are transferable). The significant points from the
example are that plans differ across the contribution and benefit formula param-
eters and that this difference in plans requires any portability arrangement to
make certain accommodations to account for those differences.
49. Note that this general type of problem can occur even if the contribution levels
and benefit formulas are exactly the same. Assume that both Kansas and Mis-
souri make Kansas' contributions and use Kansas' benefit formula, but that
teacher salaries in Missouri are twenty percent higher. Consider again an em-
ployee who goes from Kansas to Missouri under a portability arrangement that
requires Kansas to transfer the accumulated money and Missouri to credit the
worker for years of service in Kansas. Once again, the amount of money trans-
ferred would be too low (7% of low Kansas salaries would be less than 7% of
Missouri salaries) and the value of years of service would be too high (1.4% times
years times the high Missouri salary would be more than the same formula times
the low Kansas salary). The portability arrangement would need to account for
the difference in salaries.
50. See generally AURIEMMA ET AL., supra note 9. On contribution rates and benefit
formulas, Auriemma found that the combined employee and employer contribu-
tion rate in state teacher programs ranged from 6.6% (in Kansas) to 28.8% (in
Rhode Island) and that the generosity factor portion of the benefit formula
ranged from 1.1% (in Indiana) to 2.5% (in five states). See id. at 33, 40. This
illustrates the problem but understates it because the divergence in state teacher
programs is less than the divergence across all types of public and private plans.
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ments at inopportune times. Moreover, to the extent the old em-
ployer's plan is underfunded, the early transfer of assets equal to 100
percent of the present value of the transferring worker's benefits
would increase the level of the plan's under funding and, hence, re-
duce the security of the plan's remaining participants and
beneficiaries. 5 1
The cost of setting up and administering a portability system
would be another issue. The significance of the cost, or even whether
there would be a net cost, is uncertain. On the one hand, developing
and administering a portability arrangement would involve some cost.
On the other hand, a portability arrangement would tend to ease the
expense of administering small vested pensions for terminated work-
ers. Those expenses (keeping track of the worker over the years, send-
ing her annual reports, writing and mailing small checks) can be quite
significant relative to the level of the benefit.
Finally, any portability arrangement would have to deal with the
issue of incidental benefits. Some plans, but not others, provide bene-
fits in addition to the pension. The most significant of these benefits is
retiree health care. Any portability arrangement would have to re-
solve issues relating to the availability of incidental benefits.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH PORTABILITY
The problem with portability is the problem with regulation of all
employee benefits. First, employee benefit regulation occurs within
complex systems so that it is difficult to assess the likely costs and
distributional effects of changes. Although change may well be prefer-
able, in the absence of reliable information about the effects of change,
the status quo holds a powerful advantage. 52 Second, employee bene-
fits are not some sort of gift bestowed by employers on workers, but
rather an integral part of the compensation package intended to fulfill
certain employment goals. To the extent changes in the rules inter-
fere with the ability of employers to use benefits to achieve those
goals, employers will be less willing to offer employee benefits. The
balance, then, is between enhancing the protections of employees who
continue to receive benefits and attempting to ensure that benefits are
available to as many employees as possible.5 3
51. See Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Vesting and a Federal Portable Pension System, 9 J.
PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 381 (1983).
52. This is not to criticize the advantage of the status quo in uncertain situations.
Even though the status quo may not be perfect, at least we know what the cur-
rent costs and distributional consequences are. With change, comes a journey
into uncertainty, and the uncertainty itself is a cost that must be considered.
53. These problems cannot be avoided in any easy or obvious way. Certainly, divorc-
ing pensions from employment could be done. In broad terms, the pension sys-
tem could be socialized (along the lines of social security) or individualized (by
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permitting expanded IRA-type accounts). Either system would permit greater
portability since an individual's pension would not be connected to the individ-
ual's employment. But these types of grand solutions pose problems similar to,
and as daunting as, any posed by tinkering with portability rules in the current
employment-based system. Any grand solutions will also have costs and distribu-
tional effects that are difficult to specify in advance. Also any grand solution di-
vorcing pensions from employment will mean that employers will no longer be
able to use pensions to achieve their employment-related goals. As a result, any
incentive employers currently have to subsidize the cost of pensions to achieve
their goals will be gone.
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